











Rejecting Refugees in Illiberal Poland: 






Since 2015, the European Union and its members have been responding to the 
increased arrivals of migrants and refugees at Europe’s southern shores. The 
states and societies of East and Central Europe are rarely discussed in this 
context. Even though their governments support the overall EU policy 
objectives in the area of freedom, security and justice, they vocally refused to 
participate in EU ‘burden sharing’. In this way these countries earned the label 
of uniquely xenophobic. This article seeks to complicate this perception by 
highlighing how civil society in Poland responded to the right-wing Polish 
government’s anti-refugee stance. Through the lens of Aronoff and Kubik’s 
concept of Legal Transparent Civil Society (LTCS) I examine the evolving 
relationship between the ruling Law and Justice party and civil society 
organisations, proposing that activities for the benefit of refugees offer an 
insight into the transformation of civil society in the emerging illiberal political 
system.  
 




The European Union brings together 28, soon to be 27, member states. Of the 27, four 
have Mediterranean coastlines that are geographically proximate to countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa from which refugees and migrants headed for Europe 
have been departing, in fluctuating numbers, for the last twenty years.1 The scale of 
this phenomenon grew in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011 and the war in 
Syria to reach unprecedented numbers in 2015 when over one million people arrived 
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in Europe by sea. In absence of safe and legal passage to Europe, coastal states have 
had to cope not just with the logistically daunting task of managing the arrivals of 
people, but also with the fraught duties of maritime rescue. In that context, they have 
repeatedly appealed for concerted action at the European level and for support from 
other members of the European Union. In addition to EU and state level action, we 
have witnessed a mobilization of civil society involving work by established 
humanitarian actors as well as transnational activist groups (Rygiel 2016, Cuttitta 
2017a, Tazzioli 2016).  
But the map of these European activities has distinct blind spots. Largely 
absent from the recent accounts of responsive action have been the states and societies 
of East and Central Europe. That is, unless we count the attention given to the vocal 
opposition of the leaders of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to the very idea of 
accepting refugees and to the notion of EU burden sharing in response to the crisis 
(Murray and Longo 2018). For example, in September of 2015 Hungary attracted the 
media spotlight as a hostile transit point for refugees on their way from Greece to 
Northern Europe. These accounts drowned out the stories of ordinary Hungarians 
involved in grassroots efforts to help those in transit (Kallius et al. 2016, Majtényi et 
al. 2018). Alongside the news of the anti-immigrant right wing Law and Justice (PiS) 
party of Jarosław Kaczyński coming to power in Poland in October 2015, such reports 
revived the stereotypes of backward and intolerant Eastern Europeans who, as 
Dzenovska put it, ‘emerged as rogue subjects refusing to “play by the rules”’ 
(Dzenovska 2016, 1). Such narratives however do not tell a complete story. Drawing 
on research in Poland in 2017 and 2018, this article explores the domestic politics of 
the refugee crisis, with a particular focus on how civil society organisations (CSOs) 
responded to the government’s closed borders policy.  
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One of the intergovernmental responses to the so-called ‘migrant crisis’ was 
the establishment of the quota system for refugee relocations, which would see EU 
member states to accept set numbers of asylum seekers who arrived by sea (Bauböck 
2017). The program was designed as a ‘solidarity mechanism’ to lessen the burden on 
Italy and Greece (European Council 2015). In Poland, a country of 38 million, it was 
due to begin in 2016 with the initial admission of 400 people, eventually to 
accommodate 7200 (Pędziwiatr and Legut 2017). This promise, issued in 2015 by the 
previous centre-right Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, was rescinded by the PiS 
government in March 2016. Seen by Western commentators as an act of 
insubordination, it subsequently became the subject of a protracted dispute with the 
European Commission (European Commission 2017). As I show below, the conflict 
overshadowed the fact that on key matters of border and migration management, the 
Polish government remains fully aligned with the EU agenda. This agenda, as many 
scholars have argued, consistently prioritizes border security over the rights of 
migrants and asylum seekers (Cuttitta 2018). It is against this background that the 
claims of Eastern Europeans’ unique xenophobia deserve critical interrogation.  
In the years 2016-2017 the non-acceptance of African and Middle Eastern 
seaborne refugees solidified into an entrenched and popular policy of PiS.2 Opinion 
polls have measured Poles’ attitudes towards refugees since mid-2015, when only 21 
per cent objected to admitting them to Poland. In December 2017, after nearly two 
years of sustained official anti-refugee rhetoric, 75 per cent of respondents were 
against admitting persons fleeing the Middle East and Africa, of whom 52 per cent 
answered ‘definitely not’ and 23 per cent ‘probably not’ (CBOS 2017). To soften the 
edge of this state sanctioned inhospitality, the government promised to extend Polish 
foreign aid to refugees in countries of origin and transit, to help address their needs 
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‘where they are,’ thus supposedly discouraging the perilous journeys to Europe. In an 
interview given in English, the current PM Mateusz Morawiecki called this approach 
‘assistance in situ,’ thus translating the strategically ambiguous Polish phrase pomoc 
na miejscu. It literally means ‘help at the site,’ better rendered in English as ‘help at 
the source,’ as those who use it do not typically refer to the actual site of conflict but 
vaguely to the general region. Morawiecki presented such strategic use of foreign aid 
as an enlightened alternative to what his predecessor Beata Szydło described as the 
‘folly’ of admitting refugees to Europe.3  
While the country was going through a heightened anti-refugee fever, PiS 
consolidated its support base and under the slogan of ‘the good change,’ dobra 
zmiana, passed legislation dismantling key parts of the liberal democratic order, 
which had been established in Poland during the postsocialist transition. This entailed 
political control over the judiciary, suppression of freedom of assembly and attacks on 
independent media. A growing literature debates whether such developments leave 
Poland still a democracy, an ‘illiberal democracy’ or a populist, authoritarian, 
neoauthoritarian or even fascist state (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, Pech and 
Scheppele 2017, Gdula 2017, Holmes 2016). What emerges from this scholarship and 
informs this article is the observation that in the new political programme the 
(putative) ‘will of the sovereign’ overrides the rule of law and international 
commitments, particularly those stemming from EU membership.  
 
Civil Society as the Locus of Contestation 
Has the PiS hostile refusal to participate in EU relocations encountered any domestic 
challenge or pushback? Such opposition may initially seem difficult to locate. 
Opposition parties (particularly those in Parliament) remained either conspicuously 
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silent, or issued meek statements in defence of admitting refugee ‘women and 
children’ or ‘orphans,’ but not men from conflict areas. The Catholic Church, a noted 
conservative and nationalist force in Polish politics, also fell in line defying its leader 
Pope Francis on this matter (Cekiera 2017).  
Tracing the rare pro-refugee voices in the Polish public sphere back to their 
sources, I identify civil society as the most likely locus of contestation of the fast-
spreading anti-refugee convictions. For the purposes of this discussion, I understand 
civil society broadly as the sphere of association and exchange of ideas beyond the 
direct control of the state (Goodwin and Jasper 2014, 214). I take what Aronoff and 
Kubik call the ‘convergent approach’ between political science and anthropology, 
conceptualizing civil society as an object of inquiry that can be defined as an ideal 
type, but remains always historically and geographically situated (Aronoff and Kubik 
2014, 202). The authors propose a relatively narrow definition, where civil society 
consists of legally protected secondary groups characterised by transparency of their 
activities in public space, and a democratic, deliberative decision-making style. They 
argue that 
The full-fledged, “classic” civil society emerges only when transparent civil 
society and the legally protected social space coexist; we call it legal 
transparent civil society (LTCS). … LTCS is a rare form of social 
organisation; most social arrangements that are called “civil society” are 
deficient when compared with this rarely achieved ideal type. (ibid. 204)   
 
In the Polish case, civil society is a sphere that enjoyed a revival after 1989 (Ekiert 
and Kubik 1999, Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). Its role as counterbalance to the 
state, however, cannot be taken for granted. In Aronoff’s and Kubik’s model, LTCS 
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depends on the state’s commitment to the rule of law which protects the autonomy of 
civic actors. But states that successfully established the rule of law can revert to 
authoritarianism. Civil society’s independence is vulnerable to reversal when states 
selectively delegalize certain groups or outlaw free associations altogether (ibid., 
205). Such changes do not mean however that civil society ceases to exist, only that 
as the ‘L’ of LTCS disappears, what emerges are ‘hybrid forms of civic and political 
life’ (ibid., 213), such as for example dissident groups devoid of legal protection on 
the one hand, and authorised associations that operate with the imprimatur of the state 
on the other. These processes, to a different extent, are under way in Poland and in 
Hungary. The 2018 ‘Stop Soros’ law in Hungary constitutes an example of the 
authoritarian regime’s attack on critical actors within Hungarian civil society under 
the pretext of fighting illicit financial transactions. In Poland, with the exception of 
the well-publicized 2017 police raids on the offices of women’s organisations, attacks 
on civil society have been of a lower profile (Pazderski 2016). The main focus of the 
government has been to bring NGOs under greater control and to target unwanted 
activities (support for refugees, women’s rights) by means of financial punishment, as 
explained further in this essay. I ask how have civic actors responded to such 
changing legal and political environment, and to the political opportunities that arise?  
Polish civil society is heterogeneous and includes formally registered 
organisations (non-governmental organisations or NGOs) funded from public and 
private sources as well as informal grassroots groups that come together in a lasting or 
an ad-hoc fashion around a shared public purpose. The sector is active and robust,  
‘notwithstanding ideological polarization after 2015 [it is] secure, organizationally 
diverse, relatively well funded from both domestic and external sources, and 
effectively connected to transnational civil society networks’ (Ekiert and Kubik 2017, 
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48). Many organisations have a history of working with refugees and migrants, in 
some cases dating back to the early 1990s, when the state and municipal authorities 
sought ‘social partners’ to help address the needs of asylum seekers who arrived in 
Poland, first from the former Yugoslavia and later from Chechnya and to a lesser 
extent Georgia, Tajikistan, Belarus and, rarely, other countries in Central Asia and 
Africa.4 This non-profit work has been comparable to the work of NGOs in Western 
Europe, where civil society organisations support governments in their goals of 
migrant and refugee integration as well as some aspects of detention and voluntary 
return (Mayblin and James 2018, Vandevoordt  2016). Such involvement has 
sometimes prompted critics to interrogate the extent of ‘co-option’ of voluntary 
groups into the marketised and repressive system of migration management (Tyler et 
al. 2014). Such critiques however do not apply in the same way to Poland. The system 
of migration management is smaller and remains largely in the hands of the state 
(rather than being outsourced to private actors). Civil society groups provide services 
which otherwise would not have existed, such as legal aid, language training, job 
counselling, housing assistance and other forms of support, advocacy and public 
education.5  
Between June of 2017 and March 2018, I reviewed the work of eleven 
Warsaw-based civil society organisations involved in migration and refugee affairs 
domestically and abroad (see Annex). The organisations were selected on the basis of 
their own self-description and past record as civil society partners of government and 
local agencies providing services to foreigners in Poland (nine organisations) and to 
refugees/displaced persons abroad (two organisations). This disproportionate 
breakdown reflects the division of labour in the sector. Many more NGOs are active 
domestically than abroad. The latter are organisations classified as providers of 
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development and humanitarian aid. Recently, responding to the war in Syria, they 
began to run programmes for victims of displacement, taking advantage of 
government funds for ‘helping at the source.’  
The research focused on Warsaw, which has the highest concentration of 
foreign citizens of any Polish municipality, estimated at ca. three per cent in a 
population of 1,75 million at the end of 2015 (Dudkiewicz 2016).6 I reviewed three 
types of data: (a) websites, social media feeds and other materials produced by the 
CSOs; (b) Polish media coverage of the governments’ response to the ‘migrant crisis’ 
and that of relevant civic initiatives; (c) eight semi-structured interviews with 
organisation leaders and activists, on everyday experiences of operating in the altered 
political climate, from changes to funding and state-NGO relations to dealing with 
xenophobia. Where I could not speak to organisations directly, I sourced information 
from public statements, with the acknowledgment that this only partially made up for 
direct conversations. 
Notwithstanding such limitations, the research yielded a complex picture of a 
civic sector finding itself in a politically, socially and financially unsettled situation. 
The predicament however is not the same for everyone. There are previously non-
existent opportunities for groups able to work overseas and to provide services in line 
with the government’s policy of ‘helping at the source.’ Uncertainty concerns 
primarily groups operating domestically, especially those which for many years have 
relied on EU funding distributed through ministerial grants. Drawing inspiration from 
Aronoff and Kubik’s LTCS model mentioned above (2013, 205), I conceptualise 
these differences as backsliding from legally protected civil society towards a hybrid 
model involving on the one hand ‘transparent civil society’ (TCS) i.e. officially 
endorsed associations, and on the other not-yet-quite illegal, but supressed and 
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politicised groups that manifestly dissent from official state policy, while connecting 
to transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikking 1998). To capture the 
dynamics of the ensuing activities, I describe civic actors as working along and 
against the grain of state discourses and practices.  
The remainder of the article is divided into two sections. The first shows how 
PiS has used the spectre of EU relocation as a way to mobilize its supporters by 
fomenting the fear of a Muslim ‘other.’ In doing so, Kaczyński’s party drew the 
‘refugee issue’ and ‘migration crisis’ into the centre of political debate. This in turn 
politicised the question of how Polish society should help refugees, and in 
consequence also the efforts of civil society organisations involved in such help. The 
second section of the article illustrates the emerging tensions through a discussion of 
specific civic activities.  
 
Politics of fear between EU pressures and domestic priorities  
Until 2015, unlike in the West of Europe, migration and refugees did not feature in 
Polish election campaigns or political party platforms. This changed in the summer of 
that year when anti-immigrant discourse, in part transnationally linked to the Western 
far right, and in part sui generis, shifted from the margins into the mainstream.7 This 
happened without a rise in the number of refugees actually arriving in Poland. While 
the number of foreigners in Poland went up from 193,000 legally resident non-
citizens in 2015 to 300,000 in 2017, this increase is accounted for almost completely 
by immigration from Ukraine.8 The representations of Ukrainians in Poland are also 
contentious, but to a lesser degree than those of racially different ‘others’.9 Overall, 
migration figures remained net negative since 1989 and the numbers applying for 
international protection averaged at about 8,000 per year in the last decade.  
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As I have shown elsewhere, Poland in the postsocialist period has had no 
meaningful debate on immigration policy (Follis 2012). A signatory of the 1951 
Refugee Convention since 1991, it has had a dedicated government agency 
administering refugee status and subsidiary protection since 1997. It has generally 
abided by EU law on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, such as the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) (Kowalczyk 2014), and applied a laissez-faire 
approach to workers from Ukraine. The state provides 12 reception centres and 
rudimentary social benefits for refugee status applicants. NGOs provided assistance 
drawing on EU integration funds and other foreign and domestic sources, including 
the Batory Foundation established in 1989 thanks to funding from the financier-
philanthropist George Soros. Collaboration between NGOs and the state had highs 
and lows, but ran along a predictable course (Klaus et al. 2017). Only after PiS’s anti-
refugee rhetoric catapulted the issue into the centre of political debate, immigration 
came to be seen as a ‘problem.’     
 
Relocation and externalisation 
Meanwhile the Polish refusal to cooperate with the EU on relocation received 
considerable attention in the West. Media outside Poland portrayed the new anti-
refugee mood as ingratitude on the part of Poles, who were missing an opportunity to 
repay the EU for the hospitality its members extended to the Poles and for the 
generous funding of Poland’s development. Recalcitrance on relocation, the refusal to 
extend a helping hand to refugees, was understood as part of a broader de-
Europeanising shift, tantamount to ‘spitting the EU in the face’ (Dempsey 2017).  
Dzenovska offers a helpful critique of such ‘construction of the Eastern 
European subject as morally deficient’ (Dzenovska 2016, 2) suggesting that the 
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European ‘civilizing mission of the politics of compassion’ (ibid., 9) reproduces the 
distinction between morally mature Western European subjects and immature, not-
quite-European Easterners. The perpetuation of this distinction is about reasserting a 
moral hierarchy which helps obscure the fact that historically and in the present the 
European humanitarian imperative, or ‘the politics of compassion’, has been 
inextricably linked to ‘a politics of repression’ (Fassin 2005).  My findings support a 
similar contention. While indeed the rise in xenophobia accompanying the refusal was 
part and parcel of a wider anti-liberal turn, in making sense of the Polish reaction to 
the ‘migrant crisis’ I resist the implication that Western states did ‘the right thing’ by 
agreeing on relocation, while Eastern Europeans were the non-cooperative villains. 
What occurred in this case was that the politics of compassion was embodied in the 
positive valorisation of relocation as an act of ‘European solidarity’. The Polish 
government balked at this framing, demanding the liberty to define compassion as it 
sees fit, while at the same time subscribing to the politics of repression as currently 
practiced within the European border regime. Contrary to the dominant narrative of 
PiS’s permanent conflict with Brussels, the position of the Polish government on 
matters of border and migration management is in fact aligned with that of other 
member states, and the European Commission.10 In concord with the prevailing 
consensus, PiS supports the ongoing securitization of external European borders as a 
means of limiting future arrivals by land and by sea. Likewise, the party favours 
decisive removals of irregular migrants and, judging by official statements on 
‘helping at the source,’ it fully endorses one of the key points of the European Agenda 
on Migration, that is ‘to intervene upstream in regions of origin and of transit’ 
(European Commission 2015, 5). This includes support for the EU-Turkey Agreement 
of 2016, through payments into the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey and payments 
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into the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, which supports 
assistance initiatives in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.  
These interventions are elements of deterrent approach to migration from 
outside the EU. It is a product of a politics of repression, dating back to the 1990s, 
involving progressive restrictions on access to EU territories through externalizing 
migratory flows, maximizing the impermeability of EU borders by means of remote 
control, surveillance of the ‘prefrontier’ and security cooperation with third countries 
(Bigo 2014, Casas-Cortes et al. 2015, Zaiotti 2016).11 These strategies prevent tens of 
thousands of people every year from even coming close to European borders, much 
less crossing them. Hand in hand with these approaches, the EU and the member 
states have deployed humanitarian and development assistance to improve conditions 
for refugees in the region, thus facilitating containment (Cuttitta 2017b).12 Consistent 
application of this policy has led to a precipitous drop in maritime arrivals from their 
height of over 1 million in 2015 to 175 thousand in 2017.13  
For those who do reach EU territory (Italy, Greece or Spain), Frontex and 
other EU agencies in cooperation with the member states operate so called ‘hotspots’ 
to ‘swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants,’ in some cases for 
relocation to other EU Member States where their asylum application will be 
processed (European Commission 2015). However, in spite of the target of 160 
thousand people who were to be relocated based on the 2015 plans, as of May 2018 
just over 35 thousand benefitted from the program (European Commission 2018).  
In light of this trend, the Polish government’s objection to relocation was 
politically significant but practically immaterial. Rallying against the ‘imposition’ of 
‘refugee quotas’ was a symbolic assertion of sovereignty in the face of what Polish 
politicians framed as a moralizing politics of virtue driven by the old member states 
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of the EU, who seemed to assume that the new member states would simply fall in 
line. Relocation seemed to force a vision of  ‘European solidarity,’ with which many 
in Poland could not identify. Instead PiS-affiliated politicians reframed ‘Polish 
solidarity with the EU’ as 
[t]he continuously growing humanitarian assistance offered primarily (but not 
exclusively) to persons affected by the Syrian crisis. We also offer significant 
support to the EU in matters of protecting external EU borders and we nip in 
the bud recurring attempts to open new [irregular migration] transit routes. 
(Błaszczak 2017) 
The latter point, about shutting down supposed new transit routes, refers to Poland’s 
Eastern border, which at no point during the heightened arrivals of 2015 served as a 
crossing for Middle Eastern and African refugees, but where for many years persons 
fleeing Central Asia entered EU territory. The former Minister of Interior, Mariusz 
Błaszczak (since February 2018 Minister of Defence), linked those arrivals to the 
‘migrant crisis,’ reframing the admission of refugees from a matter of international 
commitments into one of security policy, which ought to remain the sole prerogative 
of the nation state. Thus, as part of the anti-refugee turn, Polish Border Guard stopped 
accepting asylum applications at the eastern border, a point to which I shall return.  
In sum, the Brussels-Warsaw rift was thus never a dispute over how best to 
solve the ‘migrant crisis’ or address the plight of refugees. For the EU as a whole 
relocation is only a minor and diminishingly important component of an approach to 
migration based on externalization and containment. To those objectives Poland 
continuously subscribes. However, the relocation issue created an opening for the 
European Commission to reprimand a recalcitrant government. In Poland, it 
represented an opportunity for the right to mobilize voters and reach beyond 
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traditional electorate by giving momentum to a politics of fear. Like elsewhere in 
Europe where anti-immigrant discourses swelled in recent years, Kaczyński’s 
partisans drew on what Douglas Holmes describes as an ‘illiberal political philosophy 
predicated on the strident discrimination of cultural affinity and difference’ (Holmes 
2016, 1). According to Ruth Wodak, ‘all right wing populist parties instrumentalise 
some kind of ethnic/religious/linguistic political minority as a scapegoat for most if 
not all current woes and subsequently construe the respective group as dangerous and 
a threat “to us,” to “our” nation’ (Wodak 2015, 2). In Poland, in absence of sizable 
immigrant communities, Law and Justice instrumentalised a phantom ‘other.’ PiS 
encouraged an a priori dread of refugees who have not yet arrived, but who would be, 
or could be resettled to Poland. Then the party vowed to stop it from happening, thus 
burnishing their credentials as defenders of the imperilled nation, international 
commitments be damned. Increasing sections of the public accepted the view that 
foreigners, especially those who are Muslim or otherwise culturally and/or racially 
‘other,’ are inherently threatening, and that the reason why Poland has not suffered a 
terrorist attack is because it has no significant Muslim immigrant communities (Hall 
and Mikulska-Jolles 2016). As such views took hold, long-standing local pro-refugee 
civil society initiatives and their activists became subject to public censure and targets 
of attacks.   
 
With and against the Grain 
If the strength of civil society were to be measured by the number of active NGOs, 
Poland, a country of 38 million, would appear relatively weak in this regard with 
70,000 voluntary sector organizations (Adamiak et al. 2016). However, it has been 
recently argued, ‘there is significant potential for robust social activism in Poland,’ 
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albeit not necessarily captured by traditional categorizations of civic activities 
(Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017, 9). The relative strength or weakness of the sector 
notwithstanding, PiS has shown that it perceives independent civic bodies as a threat 
to its conservative and centralizing agenda. Since PiS came to power many 
established organizations have encountered difficulties accessing public funds, to the 
point that, as my informants reported, many NGOs were forced to lay off staff, 
terminate long-running programmes or shut down altogether (Klaus et al. 2017). 
Many organisations have had to adjust to the new circumstances, retreat or develop a 
strategy of survival.  
The notion that actors confronted with situations can work with or against the 
grain of external facts and ideas has been applied in a variety of contexts, from 
literature (Bartholomae and Petrosky 1993) to colonial archives (Stoler 2009). For 
example to understand a text a reader can apply a strategy of reading along the grain, 
identifying with the author and giving a full consideration to his or her position. A 
critical approach involves an against the grain strategy, assuming a critical stance, 
seeking out contradictions, errors and faulty logic. The strategies apply to reading and 
otherwise engaging with official knowledge, with ‘the languages of rule and statist 
perceptions’ (Stoler 2009, 47). Here, the idea illuminates interactions between civil 
society actors and the government. How does the work of professional advocates and 
volunteer activists relate to the discourses of the government and its allies, and to the 
practices of the administrative apparatus of the state? The concept of the grain, and of 
movements against and along it, alerts us to the possibility that the alignments (with 
the grain) and tensions (against the grain) between state and civic actors might be a 
matter of strategy dependent on impermanent alliances and shifting politics, not 
necessarily fixed ideological commitments.  
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In 2015 eight percent of Poland’s 70,000 organizations described their area of 
involvement as ‘law, human rights and political activity’ and six percent as 
‘international activity’ (Adamiak et al. 2016, 80). For both categories refugees and 
migrants are among the intended beneficiaries. These include services such as legal 
assistance and intervention, integration support, human and refugee rights advocacy 
and monitoring and humanitarian assistance to victims of displacement. Additionally, 
some groups active in the area of ‘social services’ (21 percent of NGOs) and 
‘education’ (53 percent), provide domestic support to foreigners through language 
instruction, employment and psychological counselling, workshops and awareness 
campaigns. With PiS’s ascent to power and the spread of its anti-refugee rhetoric, 
actors working for the benefit of foreign citizens at home found themselves working 
against the grain of official statements and actions. Those whose activities focus on 
refugees overseas found themselves not only in alignment with declared state 
objectives, but also in sudden demand.  
 
Helping at the Source 
An informant representing an umbrella organisation for NGOs involved in 
humanitarian and development aid bemoaned the fact that, 
In the face of the ‘migrant crisis’ which is really a crisis of values, 
humanitarian aid became a very convenient method for the government to 
maintain the pretence of addressing the situation. (Interviewee 1, female) 
 
Indeed, on the one hand, since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, there has been a 
systematic increase in Polish funding for assistance programs in the Middle East 
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(Trojanek and Wnuk 2-17, 2). But the overall size of the aid budget is still regarded as 
low.  According to one report,  
The Polish government provides humanitarian aid in two ways: firstly through 
payments into the EU’s international funds (so called multilateral aid, 18.5 
million PLN [4.4 million euro] in 2016), and secondly through bilateral aid 
(16.2 million PLN [3.3 million euro]) where funds are transferred directly to 
Polish diplomatic outposts abroad and nongovernmental organizations, which 
compete for Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds. (Trojanek and Wnuk 2017, 2)  
 
Of interest to this article is the bilateral aid, which funds NGOs. In 2016 and 2017 
such monies were channelled to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not finance projects in Syria directly. It does so 
indirectly, through contributions to multilateral funds, arguing that help in Syria 
would be difficult to monitor and it would endanger aid workers (Trojanek and Wnuk 
2017, 2). According to sector insiders, many Polish NGOs are critical of the decision 
to withhold aid from Syria, noting that Syrian citizens who remain in the country are 
most in need of humanitarian assistance. These groups have also pointed out that, ‘if 
Poland and Europe hope to limit exodus from Syria, they should contribute by helping 
at the source, through re-establishing access to water, food and medicines’ (ibid.). At 
least two NGOs, Free Syria and the well-established humanitarian organization Polish 
Humanitarian Action (PAH) do run programs in Syria, but they do so drawing on 
private donations and international funds, not government sources. In 2016 
governmental funding worth just over 10 million PLN (2.3 million euros) went to four 
organisations including the Polish branch of the Catholic charity Caritas and the 
Polish Centre for International Aid (PCPM), a professional humanitarian organisation 
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founded in 2005.14 Within MFA constraints, Caritas Polska and PCPM have 
undertaken projects whose beneficiaries are Syrian refugees who left the country, but 
remain in the region. Caritas, which is involved both overseas and at home is in a 
unique position, in that on the one hand as a Church-affiliated organisation it is bound 
by PiS’s agenda and its exclusionary nationalist interpretation of Polish Catholicism 
and Polish identity, and on the other it is compelled to be responsive to the pro-
refugee advocacy of Pope Francis.  
Caritas has used MFA funds to support two clinics in the provinces of Erbil 
and Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan, providing access to medical care to refugees and IDPs 
in camps and local communities. In Jordan where it has offered housing assistance 
and supported the social adaptation of Syrian refugees. Apart from these state-funded 
programmes, since 2015 Caritas has also ran a fundraising campaign called ‘Family to 
Family’ (Rodzina rodzinie), which 
constitutes a response to Pope Francis’ call … “for a concrete expression of 
the Gospel and accepting one refugee family in every parish, sanctuary and 
convent.” Thanks to the programme … every family, community, parish, 
diocese or organisation can provide direct help to a specific suffering family, 
accepting them as [people who are] personally close, albeit geographically 
remote (Caritas n.d., emphasis added).  
 
Through voluntary financial pledges for a period of six months, Polish donor families 
support named recipients in Syria (Aleppo and surrounding area) who receive the 
assistance via Caritas’ local partners. In this way the state’s logic of ‘helping at the 
source’ without actually accepting anyone at home gets replicated at the level of 
citizens.     
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PCPM, the other main beneficiary of MFA funding is a secular humanitarian 
organization whose work for the benefit of the displaced is concentrated primarily in 
Lebanon, on the border with Syria.15 The organisation asserts that its humanitarian aid 
program there, in operation since 2012, is the largest such program by a Polish NGO 
(PCPM 2016, 10). The Lebanese government does not permit the establishment of 
refugee camps and refugees must secure private housing. PCPM provides rent 
subsidies for refugee families or expenses for host families, medical aid, vocational 
training, heating devices and blankets in winter, and initiatives related to education, 
safety and security. Over the course of the first four years of the program, it benefitted 
over 40 thousand Syrian refugees (ibid.).  
PCPM deploys a sophisticated communication strategy, which involves a 
content-rich and up-to-date website, online videos, and billboards in Polish cities 
publicising PCPM’s activities overseas through what Liisa Malkki called the 
‘universalizing representational practice’ (Malkki 1996, 11) of humanitarian imagery, 
showcasing women, children, crop harvests and home building. PCPM’s founder and 
director Wojciech Wilk is active on many platforms. A recurring theme in these 
communications is the argument that the assistance PCPM provides in Lebanon to 
persons displaced by the conflict in Syria is more economically efficient than helping 
refugees in Europe. According to Wilk,  
Humanitarian assistance in the Middle East is 3-4 times cheaper than that 
provided to refugees in Poland, and in the case of Germany the difference is 
colossal. For example, this year’s [2017] budget of Humanitarian Appeal, to 
cover planned activities of the UN and NGOs, which like PCPM, cooperate 
with the UN, comes to 9 billion dollars for the whole Syrian region. 
Meanwhile in 2015 … German expenditure on refugee and migrant welfare 
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came to 20 billion euros. Half of that amount would have covered 100 percent 
of the needs of all the aid programmes in the Middle East. (Dębski 2017)  
 
Wilk’s calculations prompt the question whether ‘all the aid programmes in the 
Middle East’ indeed constitute the right answer to conflict-related displacement and 
other socio-economic problems that continue to trigger movements of people. The 
answer is outside of the scope of this essay, but it bears noting that the implicit 
criticism of German policy aligns neatly with the position of the Polish government, 
whose members remain sharply critical of what they called Angela Merkel’s ‘open 
door policy.’ PCPM meanwhile, for the benefit of the wider public digests Wilk’s cost 
calculations into social media-friendly infographs to show that complex humanitarian 
aid to eight refugees in Lebanon requires the same means as social benefits for one 
refugee in Germany.16 Working with the grain of PiS policy, PCPM inculcates public 
recognition of, and pride in the ostensible wisdom of the Polish commitment to 
‘helping at the source’.  
 
Assistance at Home  
The view that ‘helping at the source’ is the best, or, more importantly, the only way in 
which Poland should involve itself in managing the consequences of the ‘migrant 
crisis’ is not shared by most of the experienced migrant, refugee and human rights 
groups.  Several informants representing those associations were sharply critical of 
what they called the government’s ‘propaganda’ on these matters. One informant 
noted that,    
[There] is the ethical problem of creating a [supposed] alternative between 
helping there and helping here, as if it concerned the same people, while in 
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reality there are different people who need different types of assistance, it isn’t 
that [we help] either here or there, one helps where someone needs our help, 
where we can help that is where we should be helping. (Interviewee 5) 
 
This was echoed by others who condemned the ‘false alternative’ presented by the 
government. Informants shared with me details of past and current programs ranging 
from legal aid to psychological support, job counselling, language courses and 
integration through sport (cf. Mayblin et al. 2016).  
Under PiS such programmes are under threat. The funding regime has 
changed. For example, in autumn of 2015 organisations entered bids for Ministry of 
Interior EU Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) financing, but the results 
were never announced and the competition cancelled in April of 2016 (Klaus et al. 
2017). Since 2017 these funds are distributed in a new way, via the offices of the 
voivode (wojewoda), that is regional governors who are normally political nominees. 
Voivodes were granted the right to choose ‘social partners’ for the joint realisation of 
AMIF projects, but thus far there has been little transparency in this process. The 
sheer fact of involvement in pro-refugee activity is stigmatized in PiS-friendly media 
as an ostensibly extreme-left (lewacki) project. Pro-refugee efforts are subject to 
online hate, in milder iterations represented as the ‘folly’ of political correctness, or 
more strongly as part of the alleged ‘plan to destroy Europe’ sponsored by the ‘Jewish 
billionaire George Soros.’ Rhetorical attacks on refugees and their supporters went 
hand in hand with the rapid increase, since the right’s ascent to power, in hate crimes 
against foreigners in Poland (Piela and Łukjanowicz 2018).   
 On the other hand, new sources of support and ways of organising help to 
some extent to alleviate the shortfall in funding. As state funding diminished, private 
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donations to some organisations have soared. As one informant put it ‘people are 
ashamed for their government’ (informant 2, male) and this has mobilised them to 
volunteer their time and donate directly or through taxes (taxpayers can name an 
NGO beneficiary who will receive one percent of their total taxes). Such mobilisation 
includes many Catholics disappointed not just with the government, but also with the 
Church’s failure to condemn xenophobia and embrace the refugee cause. 
Organisations are finding new, agile ways of organising outside the formalised NGO 
system, turning to loose coalitions, social media activism and public awareness 
campaigns. They merge the Polish experience with that of anti-racist movements in 
more diverse societies. Like the Greek activists described by Lazaridis and Veikou, 
they strive to sensitize, ‘the public sphere through the diffusion of information on all 
forms of discrimination, xenophobia and racism, and the organisation of petitions and 
other protest events’ (Lazaridis and Veikou, 2017, 12). They attempt to turn the tide 
of xenophobia by amplifying alternative narratives, for example through online 
content linking the struggles of contemporary refugees with the historical experiences 
of refugees from Poland in the 18th to the 20th century.  
Pro-refugee actors work in the interstices of the system against the grain of 
institutional arrangements, which obstruct access to financing, promote anti-
immigrant politics and accept xenophobic violence. They did not have the opportunity 
to serve the beneficiaries of EU relocations, but they continue to help asylum seekers 
and immigrants who find their way to Poland in other ways. For example, some 
recent interventions pushed back against the official idea that Poland’s eastern border 
is on the verge of turning into a new irregular immigration channel. Activists 
intervened against the treatment of mostly Chechen and Tajik refugees on the border 
between Poland and Belarus. For years, according to Klaus and colleagues, ‘the 
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border crossing in Terespol has been the primary location for the majority of 
applications for international protection submitted in Poland’ (Klaus et al. 2018). 
However, in the context of anti-refugee politics,  
more and more refugees were denied entry into Poland at this very facility. 
People intending to apply for refugee status have had their applications 
withdrawn by the Border Guard on grounds of no valid visa or document on 
entry.  The number of such withdrawals stood at 17,376 between January and 
September 2015, whereas between January and September 2016 it increased 
fivefold to 72,528. (ibid.) 
 
Even though the situation had nothing to do with the maritime arrivals in the south of 
Europe, the conditions on the border deteriorated as families seeking protection, with 
no means of subsistence and unable to return home camped at the train station in 
Brest, Belarus. In that context, ‘the Interior Minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, in August 
2016, … opined that Chechens did not need protection since their country was not at 
war and the situation in Terespol was “testing a new transit route for the influx of 
Muslim migrants into Europe”’ (ibid.).  
 The Association of Legal Intervention (SiP) has been consistently challenging 
this new approach in their legal work, outreach activities and publications. One report 
concludes that ‘the practice currently in place violates both international and Polish 
law and constitutes infringement of human rights’ (Chrzanowska et al. 2016, 
Górczyńska and Szczepanik 2016). SiP, alongside the Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights will now keenly observe and report on the outcome of the June 2017 
application to the European Court of Human Rights against Poland by a claimant who 
was denied entry on the border 28 times (Application no.  40503/17 M.K. against 
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Poland, 8 June 2017). The claimant alleges violation of articles 3 (prohibition of 
torture and inhuman degrading treatment), article 4 of the 4th Protocol (prohibition of 
collective expulsions), article 13 (effective remedy) and article 34 (disregarding 
interim measures issued by the court). The claimant’s initial application resulted in 
the Court issuing interim measures ordering Poland to enable him to proceed with the 
refugee status application. Poland disregarded the interim measures, a situation which 
SiP described on its website as ‘unprecedented.’  
 
Conclusion: Borders, Civil Society and the Politics of the Need to Help 
Since 2015, Polish refugee, migration and human rights advocates operate in a 
framework of refugee non-admission and ‘helping at the source’ with its specific 
administrative practices and legislative changes. CSOs whose mission involves 
humanitarian and developmental aid overseas are in a position to work with the grain 
of policy, that is partner with the government to deliver assistance to migrant and 
refugee beneficiaries in regions of origin and transit. This does not necessarily mean 
that such groups explicitly endorse the government’s political stance. Indeed, in line 
with an ethos dating back to humanitarianism’s 19th century origins, they self-identify 
as apolitical. However, organisations such as PCPM and Caritas must be prepared that 
their work might be appropriated to advance the narrative of ‘helping at the source’ 
represented as the only remedy for displacement. To be sure, the need for aid to low 
and middle-income countries that host most of the world’s refugees is widely 
acknowledged by experts. However, the questions of how best to deliver this support, 
and how it should relate to international protection and resettlement remain subject to 
complex debates (Amnesty International 2016, UNHCR 2017, Betts and Collier 
2016).   
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The Polish government’s approach ignores those debates and frames foreign 
aid as a replacement for, rather than parallel to recognizing the right to asylum. The 
effort to incentivise migrants to stay where they are through ‘helping at the source’ is 
articulated in the idiom of traditional overseas humanitarian and development aid, 
albeit carried out ‘under the Polish flag’ and informed, like all of Polish involvement 
in international aid, by Poland’s own history of suffering and struggle (Drążkiewicz-
Grodzicka 2013). As Liisa Malkki observes in her ethnography of Finnish 
humanitarianism, ‘the urge to help faraway others has domestic roots [and it is created 
by] quite specific characteristics of the home society’ (Malkki 2015, 134). In Poland, 
it is Catholicism that likely shapes the ethical stance of the subject who witnesses 
mediatised violence experienced by distant others, and may, in some cases, feel a 
desire to ‘do something’ to alleviate suffering. Yet the official Church meets this 
impulse with apathy at best and open hostility at worst. In this situation, the baffled 
subject welcomes the assurances of the government that it is indeed helping abroad, 
not only showing generosity without endangering the ‘security of Poles,’ but also 
ostensibly acting more wisely than the Germans and other Western Europeans who 
are said to have made the mistake of admitting too many refugees (Hall and 
Mikulska-Jolles 2016). Accordingly, the West is now paying the price in the form of 
high welfare bills and a persistent terror threat, while Poland avoids such problems by 
refusing to open its borders in the first place. Beyond such domestic appeal, the 
strategy of publicising Polish foreign aid is intended to elevate Poland as a 
responsible member of the international community.  
With so much political emphasis on non-admission and ‘helping at the 
source,’ those civil society organisations whose mission is to help refugees in Poland 
find themselves censured and ostracised. It would not be accurate to state that their 
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legal protections have been revoked, but they have been rendered uncertain. To fulfil 
their mission, they must work against the grain in the interstices of the system. In 
doing so, they do not follow a single script. They engage in a politics of compassion 
by raising awareness of refugee issues and providing legal and social assistance to the 
relatively small numbers of asylum applicants who do arrive in Poland, but who are 
not officially welcome. These organizations draw on shrinking resources, as public 
funding to NGOs is cut off. They take up legal cases to uphold Poland’s existing 
international protection commitments even as the ruling party is pushing for 
restrictive changes in Poland’s refugee laws. They draw on the secular idiom of 
human and refugee rights, emphasizing universal values, but some among them also 
offer a reading of history, which mobilizes empathy by highlighting Poles’ historical 
experience of displacement. They also appeal to religious values and look to the 
figure of Pope Francis over the heads of Polish bishops for ethical guidance on 
refugee matters. Ultimately, they challenge the exclusionary Polish state to open up 
and play a more benevolent role in the European response to refugee arrivals.  
In spite of these dynamics, a paradox remains. The conflict between Poland 
and the European Commission over relocation is in fact superficial, in the sense that 
both sides are united in the overriding commitment to a policy of keeping prospective 
refugees and migrants away from European borders and territories. The priorities at 
the heart of the current EU border regime are securitization, containment, deterrence, 
and aid. Kinship with this approach lends legitimacy to the discourse of ‘helping at 
the source’ and helps successive Polish PMs to frame matter the internationally as a 
reasonable policy choice.  Likewise, the efforts to keep Poland’s Eastern border 
closed to asylum seekers are hardly at odds with the current modes of policing at 
other external EU borders. Seen from this perspective, the contributions of Polish 
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civil society engage not only with the pervasive anti-refugee discourse of Kaczynski’s 
illiberal party, but they speak also to the larger externalizing dynamics of the 
European border regime. As Poland’s LTCS gradually loses the ‘L,’ it moves towards 
‘hybrid forms’ of intersection of domestic/transnational and civil/political. Where 
ordinary politics abdicates, such hybrids still challenge the state.     
   
 
 
                                                        
Notes 
 
1 For up to date quantitative information on the maritime situation see UNHCR data 
portal at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean   
2 On June 14th 2017 the European Commission launched an infringement procedure 
against Poland (and Hungary and Czechia) ‘for non-compliance with obligations 
under the 2015 Council Decisions on relocation’ (European Commission 2017). As of 
April 2018 those procedures remained ongoing.  
3 The interview with PM Morawiecki by CNN is available at  
https://youtu.be/gksyz6s2tvU (accessed 10 May 2018). PM Szydło made her 
comments following the May 21, 2017 attack in Manchester 
(https://youtu.be/3BO7C_9xizk accessed 10 May 2018). 
4 Statistics of asylum application filings dating back to 1992, with country of origin 
are available on the website of the Foreigners Office at 
https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/zestawienia-roczne/ (accessed May 
10, 2018). 
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5 Some issues, such as job counseling, language training and other integration 
measures, are within the competence of local authorities and depending on the local 
situation local NGOs might be sheltered from national level politics by virtue of 
operating in a more friendly political environment at the local level (as was the case in 
Warsaw, ruled by Civic Platform, where I conducted my research). 
6 The actual number is most likely significantly higher, including persons of irregular 
status and residing in Warsaw temporarily (ibid., 49) 
7 For similar arguments focusing on Islam and islamophobia see Narkowicz and 
Pędziwiatr 2017.  
8 These figures cover legal residents, i.e. those who granted residence permits (see the 
statistics of the Foreigners Office available at www.migracje.gov.pl). Estimates say 
that there are over 1 million Ukrainian citizens in Poland owing to a liberal system of 
work visas, which PiS spokespersons have sought to represent as a way in which 
Poland ‘helps Ukrainian refugees’ (see e.g. OKO.press 2016).  
9 Ukrainians in Poland occupy the treacherous position of ‘culturally proximate’, 
relatively desirable economic migrants who, unprotected in the labor market,  ‘do the 
work no one else wants to do’ (Follis 2012). As we know from the examples of other 
migrant receiving societies, shifting politics can rapidly turn such perceptions into 
accusations of ‘job stealing’ and violent hostility (Rzepnikowska 2017, see also 
Apostolova 2016).   
10 Kallius makes a similar argument in relation to the Hungarian policy of fence-
building around its borders (Kallius 2017). 
11 On the historical evolution of the EU border regime, see e.g. Van Houtum 2010, 
Neal 2009.  
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12 It must be said that budgets for security far exceed humanitarian expenditure. In 
2017 the EU earmarked 6 billion Euros for tackling the ‘migration crisis’ and border 
security while 1 billion was reserved for humanitarian aid across all regions 
(European Commission 2017).  
13 See n1 
14 The other ones were Polish Medical Mission and Free Syria which received minor 
funding.     
15 Helping Syrian refugees is one part of PCPM’s portfolio. Other programmes run in 
Kenya, Georgia, Ukraine and Palestine and South Sudan.  
16 See http://pcpm.org.pl/pomoc-humanitarna/liban-pomoc-dla-uchodzcow-syryjskich 
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